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Abstract
Common tax competition models suggest that welfare states will un-
dercut each other's tax rate to attract taxpayers and keep welfare recip-
ients at bay. This will lead to a zero-taxation outcome in the absence of
migration costs or other barriers to migration. This paper develops a two-
country framework with mobile altruistic taxpayers and immobile welfare
recipients. It shows that under the assumption of taxpayers motivated
by warm glow altruism, tax competition leads to unique pure strategy
Nash equilibria in taxation which are different from zero given sufficiently
strong altruistic preferences. If countries are asymmetric with respect to
the number of welfare recipients, pure altruism and inequity aversion pref-
erences support additional unique pure strategy Nash equilibria in which
the country with the fewer poor attracts more taxpayers and sets higher
taxes. This implies that rich countries may benefit from tax competition.
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1 Introduction
Most taxation, be it income tax, property tax, compulsory health or unem-
ployment insurance, constitutes a form of wealth transfer from taxpayers in the
higher income brackets to those with low or no income. Therefore, the tax com-
petition literature argues that regions and countries compete for a mobile tax
base consisting of redistribution-averse taxpayers which leads to a destructive
Race to the Bottom in taxes. This in turn makes the provision of tax-financed
public goods and welfare transfers all but impossible in the worst case.1 How-
ever, the empirical evidence for this phenomenon is rather mixed.2
In contrast to what the Race to the Bottom theory suggests, some countries
with high tax rates seem to have a high appeal for taxpaying migrants, as can be
seen from European migration patterns of highly qualified personnel (see Figure
1). Norway with a tax wedge of 43%, Sweden with 50.9% and Belgium with
60.5% (OECD, 2010) for high-earning singles, for example, are able to sustain
tax rates above the OECD average of 41.1% and are still attractive for Euro-
pean migrants.3 One could argue that in the case of Norway low unemployment
rates and high net incomes are the dominant reasons for the net influx of 40,000
migrants in 2009 (Statistics Norway, 2009). But Sweden and particularly Bel-
gium did not display low levels of unemployment and high net incomes between
2005 and 2009 as can be seen from Table 1. Furthermore, while Denmark and
the Netherlands (which are countries characterized by high net wages and low
unemployment in European comparison) lost highly qualified taxpayers between
2005 and 2009, Germany, a country with high taxes and high unemployment in
European comparison had a net migration of about zero. A common feature of
Germany, Sweden and Belgium is the high publicly mandated social expendi-
ture as a share of GDP. Thus, high taxes in combination with generous welfare
transfers do not seem to be a deterrence for many migrants. This is at odds
with the notion that taxpayers aim to pay as little taxes as possible, maximize
disposable income and migrate accordingly.
In this paper, I will show that a full Race to the Bottom in taxes does
1Of course, tax competition can also have beneficial effects such as fiscal restraint and
efficiency gains. For an overview, see Wilson (1999).
2Among the proponents of a Race to the Bottom are Brueckner (2000), Dahlberg and
Edmark (2008) and Kleven et al. (2010). Other motivations for migration and tax competition
prevail in research by Volden (2002), Bakija and Slemrod (2004) and van Dalen and Henkens
(2007).
3The OECD defines the tax wedge as the ratio between income tax, employer and employee
social contributions minus cash transfers to labour costs. The tax wedge does not include
additional compulsory contributions to privately managed pension funds or insurances.
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not need to occur under the assumptions of immobile poor welfare recipients
and perfectly mobile altruistic taxpayers who cannot decide on their income
tax levels. I will further distinguish between three types of altruism which are
discussed in detail in section 2: pure altruism as formulated by Weichenrieder
and Busch (2007), inequity aversion as proposed by Fehr and Schmidt (1999),
and warm glow as put forward by Andreoni (1990). Both inequity aversion and
warm glow have so far not been used to motivate taxation.
If warm glow preferences are assumed and altruistic sentiments are suffi-
ciently strong, an asymptotically stable unique pure strategy NE exists in which
taxation occurs. Furthermore, if countries are asymmetric with respect to the
number of poor, it is shown that there are stable pure strategy NE with pure
altruism and inequity aversion preferences. The model also suggests that rich
countries have an advantage in the competition for taxpayers. The aim of this
paper is to highlight a factor other than migration costs, namely altruistic pref-
erences, which may help to explain why high tax, high welfare benefit countries
such as Germany do not suffer from a significant flight of their taxpayers.
The first economic models to deal with the tax erosion issue were mainly
focused on tax competition within federations.4 European integration has then
sparked research on the reaction of taxes and welfare states to a trans-national
increase in mobility and free labour market access.5 For a survey of the effects
of factor mobility on redistribution, see Cremer and Pestieau (2004).
Directly related to this paper is the contribution by Weichenrieder and Busch
(2007). They present a framework in which zero taxation is the outcome in a
federation with perfectly mobile, non-altruistic taxpayers and immobile poor
who decide on the level of taxation. The same result is achieved under the
assumption of immobile homogenous taxpayers with pure altruism preferences
who can also decide on the tax rates, and perfectly mobile poor. Altruism is
modeled such that the amount of money transferred to each individual poor per-
son enters the utility function of the taxpayers. Imposing further restrictions on
the relative numbers of poor and rich citizens, the authors predict a full Race to
the Bottom in taxes in the absence of a mechanism such as delayed integration
4The analysis was centered on externalities from taxation and migration, possible tax and
transfer mechanisms to account for these externalities and general equilibrium effects from tax
competition. See, for instance, Pauly (1973), Wildasin (1991), Crane (1992) and Mansoorian
and Myers (1993). In a world without migration costs, the outcome in these models is generally
zero taxation.
5See, for instance, Cremer and Pestieau (1998), Razin et al. (2002), Sinn (2003) and Egger
and Radulescu (2009).
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under both mobility assumptions.6 Weichenrieder and Busch (2007) do not con-
sider the case in which taxpayers are mobile, altruistic and heterogeneous with
respect to the strength of their altruistic sentiment and welfare recipients are
immobile. But this setting is interesting as, given the formulation of altruistic
preferences, the migration decision of the rich now not only depends on the
number of poor, but also on the number of other taxpayers in their jurisdiction.
The altered mobility assumptions are also in line with real world observations,
as explained in section 3.1.
I show that this variation of assumptions is sufficient to prevent a full Race to
the Bottom with a warm glow formulation of altruism, even in the absence of the
delayed integration mechanism. The public good character of redistribution
introduces enough stickiness into migration decisions to allow for non-zero
taxation. Furthermore, introducing asymmetry with respect to the number of
immobile poor allows for stable NE with inequity aversion and pure altruism
preferences. Here, the heterogeneity of taxpayers' redistributive preferences is
also crucial.
Several arguments other than altruism have been put forth in the literature
to explain why a redistributive welfare state can survive in the presence of
taxpayer mobility.
First, welfare transfers act as an insurance against the sudden loss of one's
earning ability through, say, unemployment, and insurance through redistribu-
tion can cover risks for which no private insurance market exists (Sinn, 1996).
But wealthy taxpayers with safe jobs should prefer not to insure at all or to
insure themselves privately to keep out the bad risks as they end up being net
contributors in public welfare and insurance schemes.
Second, migration costs have been put forward as a reason for the possibility
of taxation: Citizens can be taxed simply because leaving the jurisdiction is more
costly (in monetary or psychological terms) for them than paying their taxes
(Mansoorian and Myers, 1993). But with increasingly multilingual populations,
fast and cheap means of transport and advanced communication via the internet,
these costs should be falling, especially for young and well educated professionals
which constitute the group most likely to migrate.7
6Delayed integration means that a taxpayer has to pay the tax rate of the country he
was living in at the start of the period, even if he migrates during the period. Tax rates are
announced at the beginning of a period before migration can take place. In a tax competition
game between two countries with finite number of periods, this mechanism is sufficient to
prevent an outcome of zero taxation.
7E.g., Thompson (2009) finds a high willingness to migrate particularly in this group.
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Third, political scientists have argued that tax competition might not take
place due to domestic and transnational political constraints (Basinger and
Hallerberg, 2004; Gilardi and Wasserfallen, 2010): On the one hand, the ma-
jority of the electorate could oppose lowering tax rates levied on the rich due
to ideological reasons even if, for instance through a Laffer curve effect, this
were to increase tax revenues. On the other hand, governments might adhere
to informal, non-enforceable agreements with other countries and do not devi-
ate unilaterally, so the Prisoner's Dilemma of the Race to the Bottom is solved
by simply agreeing to play the mutually beneficial strategy. These constraints
violate rationality assumptions commonly made in economics and are therefore
debatable.
The next section presents different concepts of altruism which will be incor-
porated into a tax competition model with warm glow in section 3 and with
pure altruism and inequity aversion in section 4. Section 5 concludes.
2 Concepts of altruism
The idea that humans are not guided purely by economic considerations, but
by a divinely commanded, innate or acquired concern for their fellow man has
been around for millennia.8 However, incorporating this notion into an eco-
nomic model requires modifications to the concept of the self-interested, coldly
calculating homo oeconomicus. This section presents three different approaches
to the idea of altruism.
A first concept is pure altruism. For instance, the formulations of altruism
in Wildasin (1991) and Weichenrieder and Busch (2007) are in line with this
notion. One could imagine that taxpayers receive utility from the tax-financed
welfare benefit an individual poor person in their jurisdiction receives. This
could be because they are genuinely good people who feel empathy for the
lot of others.9 Or they could just as well be motivated by purely egoistic rea-
sons: Having beggars off the streets, reducing poverty-related crime or, generally
speaking, keeping the masses quiet are motivations that can be captured by a
8Charity is demanded in both the Old and New Testament and the Qu'ran. The causes
and effects of charity are an important issue in Thomas Aquinas' Summa Theologiae (Ney,
2006), and Immanuel Kant (1785) deduces the duty of charity from his notion of the categorical
imperative.
9In Germany, wealthy taxpayers like Dietmar Hopp (one of the founders of SAP) and a
club of 50 millionaires have demanded higher income taxation instead of social welfare cuts
to overcome the current dire fiscal situation (Hamburger Abendblatt, 2010; ZDFinfokanal,
2010).
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preference for income redistribution. Furthermore, it could be the case that the
productivity and/or income of a rich taxpayer depends on the human capital of
the poor as he might need educated workers for his factories, as assistants, etc.
Income redistribution to pay for the poor's education is therefore rational for
taxpayers even though they do not care about the living conditions of the poor
per se.10
But utility from pure altruism does not depend on one's own contribution
in large societies and therefore suffers from free-riding issues related to public
goods.11 The individual contribution has a minimal effect on the total provision
of welfare benefits, and thus each taxpayer would state zero as his own preferred
tax rate. This implication of the notion of pure altruism has already been noted,
albeit not in its negative implications, by the German moral philosopher J.G.
Fichte in the late 18th and early 19th century. Fichte stated that a good person
wants good acts to take place and does not care by whom they are performed
(no year). There is also experimental evidence for this shortcoming of a purely
altruistic motivation, e.g. by Palfrey and Prisbrey (1997) who fail to find purely
altruistic preferences in a voluntary contributions experiment.
A second concept is inequity aversion, which has come up in recent research
as a possible driving force behind income redistribution. Here, it is not concern
for the income of others, but worries about the difference between one's own
income and that of others which leads to voluntary giving. Fehr and Schmidt
(1999), as well as Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) find that equity preference can
explain a wide range of experimental outcomes, ranging from completely selfish
behavior to full cooperation, in public good and dictator games. In addition to
fairness considerations as expressed in Bolton and Ockenfels' idea of equity and
reciprocity, the same basically egoistic motivations for an aversion to inequity
as in the pure altruism case apply.
Finally, a third approach to motivate altruistic behavior is warm glow altru-
ism which has been put forward by Andreoni (1990) and tested, amongst others,
by Palfrey and Prisbrey (1997) and Crumpler and Grossman (2008). According
to the warm glow theory, the act of giving generates utility for an individual as
he or she experiences a good feeling from being generous. Neither the utility of
the donation recipient nor the total provision of a good financed by donations
matters, only the individual contribution. The opposite effect, a cold chill, an-
10This idea is also found in Alesina and Giuliano (2009) and earlier work.
11For a discussion of group size effects on public good provision see, for instance, Isaac and
Walker (1988).
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alytically works in the same way with an inverted sign and captures the pangs
of conscience generated by not adhering to a social norm, to the direct request
of a fund raiser or similar external demands for charity.
One could argue that warm glow can only be applied to truly voluntary
giving, like donations to charities, but there are reasons why it might also be
reasonable to consider warm glow preferences in connection with taxation. A
mobile individual does not have to take the tax rate of a country as given but
can migrate to another country, and hereby choose his or her own preferred con-
tribution to the welfare state. Therefore, in a setting with competing countries,
taxes become, at least to some extent, a choice variable for individuals. Civic
duty, resulting from an upbringing in an environment in which taxation and
redistribution is the acknowledged social norm, might also induce individuals to
feel a warm glow (or at least avoid a cold chill) by paying their taxes as they
are fulfilling their perceived obligations towards society. In this respect, warm
glow can be seen as being related to the notion of tax morale.12
Finally, as Schlicht (1998) argues with his self-attribution theory, the mere
fact of doing something might lead one to like it even if another salient reason,
such as compulsion, is at hand. Hence, taxpayers might either try to fulfill an
obligation by paying taxes or satisfy an acquired taste for redistribution.
It is clear that altruism, if it is only selfishness in disguise, should extend
to the residents of a country the altruistic taxpayer lives in, not just to poor
of the same nationality. But even if altruism stems from unselfish motives,
it is reasonable to assume that altruistic feelings should be directed first and
foremost towards the poor which are visible, close-by and receive local, regional
or national news coverage. Thus, in the remainder of the paper it is assumed that
mobile taxpayers have altruistic sentiments towards the poor in the jurisdiction
they live in.
Having established the applicability of theories of altruism on taxation, I will
now turn to a model incorporating altruistic preferences in a tax competition
framework.
12Tax morale can be defined as the intrinsic motivation to pay taxes arising from the moral
obligation to pay taxes as a contribution to society (Cummings et al., 2009). Particularly in
Germany, a tax morale effect could be at work as minimizing the personal tax load through
the myriads of deductions laid down in the German tax code can be considered the social
norm, so paying the normal amount already amounts to something akin to voluntary giving
(c.f. Doerrenberg et al., 2012)
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3 A model of tax competition with warm glow
preferences
3.1 General framework
In this section, I will present a model of two countries competing for mobile
altruistic taxpayers. In the related literature, varying mobility assumptions for
rich and poor persons have been used. However, migrants are often restricted
from entering a country's social welfare system without first contributing to it.13
Furthermore, auent and well-educated persons usually have more options when
considering employment abroad. Finally, Ette and Sauer (2010) show that the
share of highly qualified personnel emigrating from Germany is disproportion-
ately high. I therefore consider the case of mobile rich and immobile poor
to be the most interesting one.
For altruistic taxpayers, income transfers can be seen as a local public good
(c.f. Pauly, 1973 and Orr, 1976), so they go shopping (c.f. Tiebout, 1956)
for their preferred rate of taxation and redistribution. It is important to notice
that altruism can call for very peculiar public goods: With warm glow altruism,
only the own contribution creates utility, while public goods generally create
utility through total contributions. Under the assumption of inequity aversion,
the own contribution via its effect on disposable income also affects the utility
from redistribution. Only redistribution motivated by pure altruism is a classic
pure public good.
There are two countries, i and j, which maximize the welfare transfer they
can offer to their local, immobile poor by maximizing tax revenue. The number
of welfare recipients is given by ni in country i and nj in country j. Govern-
ments are interested in revenue maximization for redistributive purposes as their
reelection depends on the welfare recipients: If the decisive voter in a country
is a poor person, the government will cater for his redistribution preferences if
it is interested in staying in office. The decisive role of a poor voter is ensured
within the model's framework by assuming that the number of immobile poor
within each country is greater than the total number of mobile taxpayers. Even
if all taxpayers were to migrate to one country they would still be outnumbered
and outvoted by the poor, which is an assumption also made in Weichenrieder
13In Germany,  23 para. 3 Sozialgesetzbuch (Social Security Code) XII states that foreign-
ers entering the country for the sole purpose of obtaining social security benefits are excluded
from said benefits.
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and Busch (2007). Given the typical empirical result that the median of the
income distribution is lower than its mean, and that the median voter is thus a
beneficiary of a redistributive welfare system, this assumption seems justifiable
(c.f. Meltzer and Richard, 1981). The transfer constitutes the only income for
welfare recipients. By taking into account the migration decisions of the tax-
payers which are determined by their utility functions, governments implicitly
also have to consider the welfare of the rich.
This model setup implies that in autarky, i.e. if taxpayers were not mobile,
countries would try to fully expropriate taxpayers. To prevent full expropriation,
one could assume that the possibility of taxation is restricted by bureaucratic
inefficiencies so that the highest possible tax rate is smaller than the exogenous
income (Weichenrieder and Busch, 2007). Countries will thus only suffer tax
revenue reductions with mobile taxpayers if tax competition drives equilibrium
tax rates below those possible in autarky.14
Countries i and j collect a lump-sum tax bi, bj with 0 ≤ bi, bj ≤ x from a
continuum K with mass 1 of costlessly mobile taxpayers earning an exogenously
given income x > 0 who incorporate some form of altruism, to be specified later,
in their utility functions. As stated above, to make the decisive voter a welfare
recipient it is assumed that ni, nj > 1. Taxpayers are heterogeneous with respect
to to the strength of their altruistic motivation. It is assumed that each country
initially hosts one half of the mass of taxpayers, and that taxpayers do not have
a home country preference, i.e. they do not intrinsically prefer living in one
country over the other. Given the strength of his or her altruistic feeling, the
tax rate and (in the case of inequity aversion and pure altruism) the number
of immobile poor in each country, a taxpayer decides on whether to stay in
his home country or migrate. Furthermore, taxpayers are unable to coordinate
their migration decisions even if it were beneficial for them to all settle in the
same country, and they take each others migration decision as given.
Taxpayer k K is assumed to have the following quasi-linear utility function
14An upper bound on redistribution could also be introduced by shedding the assumption
that welfare recipients always outnumber taxpayers. But this would pose two problems. First,
taxpayers would all want to settle within the same country to maximize their vote share. If the
migration decision of a taxpayer depends on that of other taxpayers, a stable pure strategy NE
may no longer exist as will turn out to be the case with pure altruism and inequity aversion
preferences. Second, it would become necessary to calculate the decisive median voter. If he
were a taxpayer, his location on the α- continuum would depend on the number of poor within
the jurisdiction as all welfare recipients would prefer full expropriation. In turn, even with
warm glow preferences the amount of redistribution would become dependent on the number
of poor.
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if he settles in country i:15
Uk,i = V (x− bi) + αkW (bi) (1)
V is a concave function of the taxpayer's disposable income with V (0) =
0, ∂V∂x (0) = ∞, ∂V∂x > 0, ∂
2V
∂x2 < 0. W is a linear function and can be speci-
fied to account for different types of altruism (see Table 2). αk is the strength
of k's altruistic motivation, with 0 < αk ≤ l. The assumption of 0 < αk ≤ l <∞
is needed to ensure the stability of the NE.16 In the following sections, it is as-
sumed that αk is drawn from a truncated normal distribution between 0 and l
with mean=median µ, 0 < µ < l, and standard deviation σv > 0.17 Note that
taxpayers are costlessly mobile, which leads to a zero taxation outcome in the
absence of altruism. Taxpayers also only care about welfare transfers in the
country they settle in.18
Given the tax rates bi and bj , it can be determined where each individual
taxpayer will settle by calculating a cutoff level α∗ which corresponds to a
taxpayer's α who is just indifferent as to which country he lives in. This is done
by setting the utility a taxpayer would gain in each country (given by (1)) equal
and solving for α∗:
V (x− bi) + α∗W (bi) = V (x− bj) + α∗W (bj)
⇒ α∗ = V (x− bj)− V (x− bi)
W (bi)−W (bj) (2)
Assuming the same number of poor in each country, a taxpayer k with αk > α∗
15As this paper neither examines distributional questions nor principal-agent problems, the
critique of the quasi-linearity assumption in public finance and political economy models as
put forward in the introduction of Dixit et al. (1997) does not apply. As Boadway et al. (2002)
notice, the quasi-linearity assumption is of course questionable but commonly used. In the
context of this paper, it makes the most sense to attribute the concave part to disposable
income, as this ensures that at least for small incomes disposable income is preferred to
altruistic redistribution.
16Including the zero bound makes it possible for a country to always attract marginally
more taxpayers by marginally lowering the tax rate. If α were infinite, a country could always
attract marginally more taxpayers by setting a higher tax rate. An unbounded distribution
of altruistic preferences is also an unrealistic assumption.
17Experimental evidence (e.g. Andreoni and Miller (2002) and Fehr and Schmidt (1999))
supports the idea of heterogeneous individuals with respect to altruistic preferences.
18As Pauly (1973) argues, altruism is motivated by perceiving the plight of others, and dire
living conditions close-by are more likely to be perceived than those far away. As pointed out
in section 2, altruism that is motivated by a preference for not being confronted with poverty
and its manifestations is also likely to depend on the level of poverty in the vicinity of the
taxpayer.
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will settle in the country with higher welfare transfers, while one with αk <
α∗ chooses the country with lower transfer levels.19 Thus, the more altruistic
taxpayers choose the country with higher taxation and higher welfare benefits.
Given the taxpayers' migration decision, the model is solvable by backward
induction: Each country non-cooperatively and simultaneously chooses a tax
level while taking into account the other country's possible decision and the
resulting taxpayer migration. Taxpayers then choose whether to stay in their
home country or migrate. The optimization problem for country i's tax revenues
is thus
max
bi
bi ×mi(x, bi, bj , ni, nj) (3)
where mi is the number of taxpayers who settle in country i.
Several formulations of the altruistic preferences can now be imagined, based
on the different concepts of altruism presented in the previous section. These are
summarized in Table 2. As can be seen from these formulas, in the warm glow
case utility from transfers only depends on the own contribution. In the pure
altruism case, the size of the transfer to each individual poor person matters,
while in the inequity aversion case, the sign of W changes from + to  (as
income differences create disutility) and disutility depends on the difference
between disposable income and the transfer to each individual welfare recipient.
Given this setup, unique pure strategy NE values for taxation can be found
which differ from the Race to the Bottom result of zero taxation. These equi-
libria will be derived in the following sections. The simple intuition for the ex-
istence of equilibria with positive taxation is that governments provide a good
which is coveted by mobile taxpayers. The repelling effect of a lower disposable
income is countered by the attraction of the good.
To illustrate the typical results of tax competition models lacking mobility
constraints or other competition-reducing assumptions, I will briefly cover the
results of the model in the absence of altruism. In this case, the utility of a
taxpayer will only depend on his or her disposable income in a given country,
that is, Uk,i = V (x − bi). Obviously, all taxpayers will choose to move to the
country that levies the lowest tax rate as their preferred tax rate is zero.
The implication for the tax competition between two states is that a country
19Note that, depending on bi and bj , α∗ can take values greater than l and smaller than 0.
But this only means that, given the distributional boundaries α, there is no such taxpayer in
the population. Therefore, if α∗ is out of bounds, all taxpayers have either α < α∗ and will
move to the low benefit country, or α > α∗, resulting in a full relocation to the high benefit
country.
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can attract all taxpayers by marginally undercutting the other's tax rate. This
will lead to ever smaller tax rates as countries continuously undercut each other,
resulting in the only stable outcome of zero taxation in both countries. Any
country setting a positive tax rate will not have a tax base to charge taxes from.
This is also the result in the Weichenrieder and Busch (2007) model in the case
of perfectly mobile, non-altruistic taxpayers without delayed integration and
in line with the standard non-collusive result of Bertrand competition.
3.2 Introducing warm glow preferences
In the warm glow setting, a taxpayer receives utility from his own tax payment,
regardless of the resulting individual transfer to each welfare recipient. Taxpayer
k's utility in country i is now given by
Uk,i = V (x− bi) + αkbi (4)
and the indifferent taxpayer's α∗, from (2), is determined by
α∗ =
V (x− bj)− V (x− bi)
bi − bj (5)
The preferred tax rate of taxpayer k, bk, is implicitly given as a function of the
strength of his altruistic sentiment. It is derived by maximizing (4) with respect
to bi, denoting ∂V (x− bi)/∂bi as V ′(x− bi), and replacing bi by bk:
V ′(x− bk) = αk (6)
The number of taxpayers in countries i and j (denoted by mi and mj)
given bi and bj is determined by α∗. Remember that the country setting the
lower tax rate will attract all taxpayers with α < α∗ as utility from transfers is
equal to tax payments in this setting. Given the distribution of α it is possible
to calculate the number m of taxpayers with α < α∗ from the cumulative
distribution function (cdf) of a truncated normal distribution:
m =
Φ(α
∗−µ
sv
)− Φ( 0−µ
sv
)
Φ( l−µ
sv
)− Φ( 0−µ
sv
)
(7)
The term on the right-hand side gives the value of the cdf at α∗, with Φ being
the cdf of a standard normal distribution. See Figure 2 for a graphical example.
As the mass of taxpayers is normalized to 1, (7) directly gives the number of
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taxpayers who choose the country with the lower tax rate. The number of people
settling in the higher tax country is thus simply 1−m.
Having determined the migration decision of the taxpayers, it is possible to
calculate the tax revenues for each country. Tax revenue pii in country i is given
by
pii = bi ×mi =

bi ×m if bi < bj
bi × (1−m) if bi > bj
0.5× bi if bi = bj
(8)
Taking the other country's taxation decision as given, country i will decide on
a tax revenue maximizing tax rate.
Now define b∗ as the tax rate preferred by the taxpayer whose α is equal to
the median of the truncated normal distribution from which α is drawn. One
half of the taxpayers will prefer a higher tax rate, one half a lower tax rate than
the median taxpayer. The median of the truncated distribution, denoted as µ∗,
is calculated from the mean and standard deviation of the underlying normal
distribution as follows:
µ∗ = Φ−1
(
1
2 × (Φ( l−µsv ) + Φ( 0−µsv ))− µ
σv
)
(9)
From (6), by substituting µ∗ for αk and b∗ for bk, b∗ is implicitly given by
V ′(x− b∗) = µ∗ (10)
The median taxpayer will only favour redistribution if (10) holds for non-
negative b∗, which becomes more likely as x and, by the properties of V , µ∗
increase. Similarly, the desired amount of redistribution increases in x and µ∗.
I will now show that b∗ (if non-negative) is the tax rate adopted by both
countries in the unique pure strategy NE of this model. The analytical proofs
for existence, stability and uniqueness can be found in the Appendix.
If both countries set their tax rates equal to b∗, each country will attract
exactly half of the total population of mobile taxpayers. An unilateral deviation
by a country cannot increase its tax revenues: If it sets a lower tax rate, it loses
taxpayers and levies a lower per capita tax rate. If it sets a higher tax rate, the
negative migratory response outweighs the beneficial effect of having higher per
capita tax revenues.
If one country does not set a tax rate of b∗, the other country reacts in
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the following way: Assume that country j deviates from b∗. If it sets a lower
tax rate, country i can set a higher tax rate than country j and attract more
taxpayers as more than half the number of taxpayers prefers a tax rate higher
than the one set by j. If country j sets a higher tax rate than b∗, country i can
marginally undercut this tax rate and attract more taxpayers at a higher tax
rate than b∗. Country i's best-response function thus takes the form
bi =

bj − ε if bj > b∗
1−m
∂m/∂bi
> bj if bj < b
∗
b∗ if bj = b∗
(11)
An exemplary best-response function is shown in Figure 3. If b∗ > 0, a pure
strategy NE exists.20
The NE tax rate implicitly given by (10) displays several characteristics:
First, a full Race to the Bottom is avoided as both countries will choose the
same positive tax rate if (10) holds for non-negative b∗, which becomes more
probable as µ, l and x increase (from (9), µ∗ is a positive function of µ and
l). Second, an increase in the mean value and the upper limit of the altruistic
preferences distribution will increase the optimal tax rate as can be seen from
(10) and (9), while the effect of an increase in σ depends on whether µ is above
(negative effect) or below (positive effect) l/2. The reason for this mechanism is
that if α were uniformly distributed between 0 and l, the optimal tax rate would
be the one preferred by the taxpayer with α = l/2. As the standard deviation
of the normal distribution increases, it becomes closer in form to the uniform
distribution, and therefore the equilibrium tax rate with a normal distribution
will converge towards the one achieved with a uniform distribution. Third, due
to the quasi-linear formulation of preferences, with a sufficiently large x all fur-
ther increases in income will be taxed away to provide welfare transfers. Welfare
recipients can thus end up with a higher income than taxpayers. This feature of
20As long as (6) holds for non-negative bi if α = l, zero taxation is still not a possible
outcome of tax competition as at least taxpayers with an α of l will still be in favour of some
taxation. The marginal utility from welfare benefits is l for an individual with α = l, so he
or she prefers taxation if the marginal utility from disposable income is smaller than l, which
in the quasi-linear setting is the case if −V ′(x − b) < l. A country will be able to attract
the most altruistic taxpayers and generate tax revenues by setting a tax rate between 0 and
the tax rate which makes the most altruistic taxpayer just indifferent between no taxation
and taxation with redistribution. However, this will only be a NE in mixed strategies as a
country slightly undercutting the other's tax rate will be able to attract all taxpayers who
would prefer a zero-level of taxation. But playing a mixed strategy with a positive probability
of setting a non-zero tax rate dominates constantly choosing a tax rate of 0.
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the model stems only from the quasi-linear formulation and has no implications
for the real world, of course. By appropriately choosing the parameters of the
model, it would be possible to rule out this result.
Proposition 1: Assuming warm glow preferences, if b∗ > 0 a unique and stable
pure strategy NE for taxation exists in which both countries choose the non-zero
tax rate that corresponds to the one preferred by the taxpayer with α = µ∗.
Proof: See the Appendix.
This result is not affected in any way by the number of welfare recipients as
taxpayers value only the size of their own contribution, not the impact it has
on individual welfare payments.
In the case of warm glow altruism, the NE is robust to the relaxation of the
assumption that countries choose their tax rates simultaneously. Assume that
country i moves first. As shown in the Appendix, the best tax rate country i
can set is b∗. If country i chooses a lower tax rate, country j will be able to
attract more taxpayers than country i at a higher tax rate at the expense of
country i. Country i will end up with less taxpayers and a lower tax rate if
it sets bi < b∗ which is clearly not optimal. If country i chooses a higher tax
rate than b∗, country j will find it optimal to set a marginally lower tax rate
which will lead to migration towards country j. In the case of bi > bj > b∗,
the negative migratory effect offsets country i's gains from a higher tax rate,
and thus setting a higher tax than b∗ cannot be optimal. Therefore, as country
j will never choose bj = bi 6= b∗ because it can do better by setting a higher
or lower tax rate, and as country i's tax revenues will always be non-optimal if
it sets bi 6= b∗, the best option country i has is to choose bi = b∗ as this will
induce country j to also select this tax rate. The model thus confers neither a
first-mover advantage nor disadvantage.
The results of the warm glow model are neither affected by asymmetry be-
tween the two countries with respect to the number of welfare recipients nor
by spatial altruistic preferences (concern for the poor in other jurisdictions)
as in Pauly (1973). ni and nj do not enter the utility function of taxpayers,
and a taxpayer's own contribution generates utility regardless of the resulting
individual transfer to each welfare recipient and his location.
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4 Introducing pure altruism and inequity aver-
sion preferences
4.1 Symmetric countries
In this section I introduce pure altruism and inequity aversion as two other pos-
sible ways to model other-regarding preferences. I first consider the symmetric
case, ni = nj . It turns out that in this case pure altruism and inequity aversion
only support unstable pure strategy NE.
With pure altruism preferences, transfers made by all taxpayers within a
country enter the utility function of each taxpayer, and so does the number of
welfare recipients. Hence, taxpayer k's utility in country i is now given by
Uk,i = V (x− bi) + αk × bimi
ni
(12)
Note that utility now not only depends on the tax rate, but also on the number
of poor and the number of taxpayers within the chosen country. Assuming pure
altruism preferences and given a sufficiently large µ∗ and x, an unstable unique
pure strategy NE for taxation exists in which both countries choose the non-zero
tax rate that is preferred by the taxpayer with median altruistic preferences (see
Appendix for a proof). The equilibrium tax rate is decreasing in the number
of poor. The instability stems from the fact that the migratory response in-
duced by a tax rate change will trigger another migratory movement away from
the deviating country. An outflow of taxpayers makes the deviating country
less attractive for taxpayers, and emigration continues until all taxpayers are
concentrated in the other country.
Under the assumption of altruism motivated by inequity aversion, taxpayers
care about the difference between their disposable income and the income (con-
sisting solely of the transfer) of each individual welfare recipient. The transfer
income in turn depends on the number of taxpayer living within a given country.
The main difference to pure altruism is that, as can be seen in (13), the tax
rate enters the utility function positively twice. Inequity aversion thus presents a
stronger kind of altruism than pure altruism. Taxpayer k has a utility function
of the form
Uk,i = V (x− bi)− αk × (x− bi − bimi
ni
) (13)
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A unique pure strategy NE exists with inequity aversion preferences but it is also
unstable because the same migratory responses will follow a deviation from the
optimal tax rate as in the pure altruism case. A graphical comparison between
the equilibrium tax rates achieved under each preference assumption is shown
in Figure 4.
4.2 Asymmetric countries
A more interesting case is the outcome of tax competition with asymmetric
countries with respect to the number of welfare recipients. One could expect
that countries which have to support a smaller number of poor people have an
advantage in the competition for taxpayers, at least if the transfer per welfare
recipient matters as in the inequity aversion and pure altruism cases. Taxation
under the assumption of a warm glow feeling from paying taxes is not affected,
as a taxpayer's utility depends neither on the number of other taxpayers in his
jurisdiction, nor on the income of the poor. A smaller number of poor indicates
a richer country as the distribution of taxpayers is assumed to be even at the
outset.21
Intuitively, introducing asymmetry prevents the poorer country from mim-
icking the richer country's taxation choices, while the richer country has no
incentive to marginally undercut or exceed the poorer country's tax rate. Mi-
gratory movements are no longer all-or-nothing as in the symmetric case because
tax rates have to be different for rich and poor countries in equilibrium. With
sufficiently altruistic taxpayers, asymmetric countries allow for a stable NE in
contrast to the symmetric case.22
An equilibrium in the case of asymmetric countries has to fulfill two condi-
tions: First, no taxpayer must have an incentive to migrate given his altruistic
preferences, the distribution of taxpayers and the tax rates. Second, no country
must have an incentive to alter its tax rate and thereby generate higher tax rev-
enues. It is obvious that in any equilibrium the country with the larger number
of poor will set a lower tax rate than the other one as it has a disadvantage in
welfare provision: For a given tax rate, the individual transfer decreases in the
21This is not synonymous with a smaller country size. It has been argued, for instance
by Chatelais and Peyrat (2008), that small countries are drivers of tax competition as their
benefits (attracting taxpayers) from lowering the tax rate outweigh the drawbacks (lower tax
rates) in relation to their small GDP. This is not the case for large countries.
22The assumption that taxpayers differ in their valuation of redistribution is crucial here. If
all taxpayers were the same obviously either no or every taxpayer would migrate in reaction
to a change in tax rates.
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number of poor people. If a poor and a rich country were to set the same tax
rate all taxpayers would locate in the rich country as they could then benefit
from higher welfare provision at the same tax rate. Thus, the rich country could
attract all taxpayers by imitating the poor country's tax rate if it were higher
than its own in the first place. The rich country will also be able to provide
higher welfare benefits than the poor one which means that mi = 1 − m in
equilibrium, so the less altruistic taxpayers will settle in the poor country.
Taking the poor country's taxation decision as given, the rich country faces
an outflow of taxpayers when increasing its tax rate which will here be illustrated
for the case of pure altruism (inequity aversion is analytically similar). Assume
that ni < nj , i.e. that country i is rich and decides on setting a tax rate bi > bj .
Country i's tax revenue function is then given by
pii = bi ×mi = bi × (1−
Φ(α
∗−µ
sv
)− Φ( 0−µ
sv
)
Φ( l−µ
sv
)− Φ( 0−µ
sv
)
) (14)
pii is a function of α∗ which, from (2), is given by
α∗ =
V (x− bj)− V (x− bi)
bimi
ni
− bj(1−mi)nj
(15)
The number of taxpayers in country i falls with bi as the derivative of (15) with
respect to bi is positive (remember that taxpayers with α < α∗ prefer to live in
the country with lower welfare provision, i.e. the poor one):
∂α∗
∂bi
=
V ′(x− bi)
( bimini −
bj(1−mi)
nj
)
+
mi × (V (x− bi)− V (x− bj))
ni × ( bimini −
bj(1−mi)
nj
)2
> 0 (16)
So mi falls as α∗ increases, which in turn will again increase α∗:
∂α∗
∂mi
= −bi × (V (x− bj)− V (x− bi))
ni × ( bimini −
bj(1−mi)
nj
)2
< 0 (17)
But as the second derivative of (15) with respect tomi is positive and the second
derivative of mi with respect to α∗ is negative, the migratory response peters
out (see Appendix). This means that a marginal change in tax rates will not
induce all taxpayers to migrate to the same country. When choosing bi, country
i thus can balance the positive effect of a higher tax rate against the negative
effect of a smaller number of taxpayers. For a given bi, the tax revenue function
for country j looks similar; mj is a decreasing function of bj , and changes in bj
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will trigger only a limited migratory response.
mj = m (the number of taxpayers settling in the low welfare benefit country)
as a function of bi is exemplarily shown in Figure 5. This function is convex in
bi, and thus 1 −m is concave. If pii|bj = bi × (1 −m) has a global maximum
in bi and pij |bi = bj ×m in bj , a NE occurs if a combination of bi and bj exists
for which both tax revenue functions are maximized. As shown in Figure 6,
the existence of a NE depends on µ and l: As both variables increase, and thus
as the taxpayers become more altruistic, the existence of a NE becomes more
likely. Furthermore, the resulting NE does not depend on the initial distribution
of taxpayers, so it is stable because deviations from the equilibrium values of
bi and bj will not lead to an endless cycle of tax adjustments as in the case
of symmetric countries. Since explicitly solving the model if the number of
poor differs between countries is impossible due to polynomial equations of high
degree, the proof in the Appendix gives fairly general conditions for the existence
and stability of an equilibrium.
The model results for varying nj given ni are shown in Figure 7. Starting
from an initially given distribution of taxpayers, the values were achieved by
letting the countries alternately choose their optimal (tax revenue maximizing)
tax rate while taking into account the migratory responses. Using this mecha-
nism, a NE is reached if no country has an incentive to deviate from its tax rate
and the distribution of taxpayers between countries remains stable.
Tax rates generally increase in µ, and inequity aversion, the stronger form
of altruism, produces higher equilibrium outcomes. Increasing nj will raise the
equilibrium tax rate in both countries. For the poorer country, this is because
higher taxation is required and accepted by the remaining taxpayers to com-
pensate for the reduced p.c. transfer, while for the richer country the relative
advantage in welfare provision p.c. increases which makes a higher tax rate
feasible. It is also important to note that most taxpayer locate in the high
tax/low poverty country and the number of taxpayers is falling in nj , so having
to support only few welfare recipients in comparison to other countries con-
fers a twofold advantage: On the one hand, higher tax rates are sustainable in
equilibrium, and on the other hand, most tax payers prefer the high tax country.
Proposition 2: If countries differ with respect to the number of welfare recip-
ients and given sufficiently high x and µ∗, a unique stable NE exists with pure
altruism and inequity aversion preferences in which the country with the lower
number of poor will set higher taxes and attract more taxpayers.
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Proof: See the Appendix.
In comparison to autarky, the richer country may be able to generate higher
tax revenues if the tax revenue losses from a potentially lower tax rate are offset
by the gains from a larger tax base. The poorer country suffers a reduction in
tax revenues if taxpayers are mobile as it will lose taxpayers and end up with a
lower tax rate as well.
5 Conclusion
Existing models of tax competition predict that in the absence of migration
costs and other barriers to migration, countries will be forced to lower taxes
and dismantle their welfare states. In contrast, the model presented in this
paper can explain the stickiness of taxpayers and the absence of a full Race
to the Bottom due to migratory pressures by assuming an altruistic motivation
of taxpayers. Warm glow preferences in general and pure altruism and inequity
aversion preferences with countries asymmetric with respect to the number of
poor inhabitants turn out to be sufficient to support stable NE.
The result put forward in Proposition 1 is based on a utility function that
is in accordance with the notion of warm glow. The existence of a positive
welfare transfer depends only on the income and the distribution of altruistic
preferences. If taxpayers are suitably characterized by this utility function, it is
fair to say that the high incomes in Western countries and the degree of social
cohesion and identification with the political system, which could be used as a
proxy for the strength of altruistic preferences, are sufficient to maintain welfare
states.23 A dispersion of preferences is increasing tax rates in the likely case
that a population is on average less altruistic than a uniform distribution would
suggest. Heterogeneity of preferences is experimentally found by Andreoni and
Miller (2002), who also state that three quarters of their test subjects display
some form of altruistic behavior.
Pitting poor and rich countries against each other, Proposition 2 is congruent
with real-world observations: Poor countries struggle to keep their taxpaying
population and set lower taxes, while rich countries are attractive as they only
have to distribute their tax revenues to a smaller number of welfare recipients.
23An economic model dealing with the state-directed strengthening of these factors is put
forward by Konrad (2008). In his model, countries can invest in the loyalty of their taxpayers
which alters the outcome of tax competition between countries.
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E.g., the tax wedge was 60.5% in Belgium in 2009 for high-earning singles,
but only 20.8% in Mexico and 34.9% in Poland (OECD, 2010). Even between
wealthy countries, this effect should be visible, which could explain some of
the pull high tax/low poverty countries such as Sweden with a positive net
migration of about 60,000 in 2009 and Belgium exert on European migrants
(Statistics Sweden, 2010).
Having stated the implications of the propositions, one should be aware that
the model is mainly applicable to economically equally developed countries with
politically and culturally similar inhabitants. The distribution of altruistic pref-
erences certainly varies between Western countries, and even more so between
the West and Eastern and Asian countries.24 The altruistic mobile tax base
should be seen, also due to migration costs which are more important for mi-
grants from other cultures and continents, in a European or at least Western
context. Tax adjustments are long-term processes, so under the assumption of
warm glow altruism and asymmetric pure altruism and inequity aversion one
should not expect to see the predicted results at this time in European policy,
but rather adjustments towards equilibrium.
Of course, migration decisions and the scope of welfare states do not depend
on tax differentials alone, and tax competition is not the only problem arising
from the free movement of production factors.25 As various studies suggest,
countries can attract migratory flows through a host of other positive char-
acteristics, and the generosity of welfare states is also dependent on political
and economic factors.26 But the reasonable assumption of altruistic preferences
when it comes to paying taxes can help to explain why the specter of the Race
to the Bottom of welfare states has so far failed to materialize.
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Tables and Figures
Country Average
net income
for a
single
worker,
no kids,
earning
170% of
the
average
wage in
US$ (2005-
2009)
Tax wedge
for a
single
worker,no
kids,
earning
167% of
the
average
wage in %
(2009)
Net
pub-
licly
man-
dated
social
expen-
diture
in % of
GDP
(2007)
Average
indi-
rect
tax
rate in
%
(2007)
Average
unem-
ploy-
ment
rate in
%
(2005-
2009)
Austria 53742.82 50.1 24.8 16.4 4.58
Belgium 45383.41 60.5 26.2 15.1 7.84
Denmark 53360.46 48.6 23.9 26.0 4.40
Finland 50644.36 48.2 22.6 19.9 7.50
France 48382.80 53.1 29.9 14.4 8.84
Germany 49352.55 53.0 27.2 14.2 9.10
Luxembourg 67303.30 41.1 19.1 23.7 4.70
Mexico N/A 20.8 9.0 6.0 4.08
Netherlands 55525.10 41.8 20.4 23.5 4.00
Norway 74285.78 43.0 20.0 23.5 3.20
Poland 12867.62 34.9 18.8 17.9 11.34
Spain 38092.14 41.6 21.6 12.5 11.08
Sweden 49578.42 50.9 26.0 20.7 7.08
Switzerland 77866.91 33.6 N/A N/A 3.74
United
Kingdom
69274.85 37.0 22.7 12.8 5.74
United
States
47441.14 34.6 18.9 4.1 5.88
OECD
Average
N/A 41.1 20.2 15.1 6.64
Table 1: Tax wedges and welfare expenditures for selected OECD countries.
(OECD, 2007,2010,2011)
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Type of altruistic preference Formal representation
No Altruism W ≡ 0
Warm Glow Wi(bi) = bi
Pure Altruism Wi(bi,mi, ni) = bi × mini
Inequity Aversion Wi(x, bi,mi, ni) = x− bi − bi × mini
Table 2: Formal representation of the different types of altruistic preferences
Figure 1: Emigration, immigration and net migration of scientists and exec-
utives (ISCO 1 and 2) between EU-15 countries, yearly averages between 2005
and 2009. Adapted from Ette and Sauer (2010)
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Figure 2: Cumulative distribution function of α with µ = 0.4, σ = 0.2, l = 1.
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Figure 3: Best-response function of country i to country j's tax rate with warm
glow, V (.) ≡√(.), x = 10, µ = 0.4, σ = 0.5, l = 1.
Figure 4: Equilibrium tax levels for symmetric pure altruism, inequity aversion
and warm glow. V (.) ≡√(.), x = 10, σ = 0.1, l = 1.
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Figure 5: mj for varying bi with asymmetric pure altruism. V (.) ≡
√
(.), x =
10, bj = 0.1, µ = 1, σ = 1, l = 3, ni = 1, nj = 2.
Figure 6: Existence of NE for pure altruism with asymmetric countries.
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Figure 7: Equilibrium tax levels with asymmetric countries, V (.) =
√
(.), x =
1,ni = 1.
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Appendix to section 3
Proof of the existence of a NE for warm glow
There exists a symmetric NE in tax rates given by
bi = bj = b
∗ (A.1)
Assume that country j sets bj = b∗. The number of taxpayers per country
has to be 0.5 in a symmetric equilibrium, therefore it is necessary that mi → 0.5
as bi → b∗. Utilizing L'Hôpital's rule to determine the value of (5) as bi → b∗,
the limit of mi is given by
lim
bi→b∗
Φ(α
∗−µ
sv
)− Φ( 0−µ
sv
)
Φ( 1−µ
sv
)− Φ( 0−µ
sv
)
=
Φ
(
µ∗−µ
sv
)
− Φ( 0−µ
sv
)
Φ( l−µ
sv
)− Φ( 0−µ
sv
)
= 0.5 (A.2)
In equilibrium, pii = pij and therefore it is required that pii → pij as bi → b∗:
lim
bi→b∗
pii = lim
bi→b∗
bi
Φ(α
∗−µ
sv
)− Φ( 0−µ
sv
)
Φ( l−µ
sv
)-Φ( 0−µ
sv
)
= pij =
b∗
2
(A.3)
What is left to prove is that pii is strictly increasing (decreasing) in bi below
(above) b∗. For bi < b∗,
∂pii
∂bi
= bi ×
∂α∗
∂bi
× 1
sv
φ(α
∗−µ
sv
)
Φ( l−µ
sv
)− Φ( 0−µ
sv
)
+
Φ(α
∗−µ
sv
)− Φ( 0−µ
sv
)
Φ( l−µ
sv
)− Φ( 0−µ
sv
)
> 0 (A.4)
with φ being the probability density function of a standard normal distribution.
For bi > b∗,
∂pii
∂bi
= −bi ×
∂α∗
∂bi
× 1
sv
φ(α
∗−µ
sv
)
Φ( l−µ
sv
)− Φ( 0−µ
sv
)
− Φ(
α∗−µ
sv
)− Φ( 0−µ
sv
)
Φ( l−µ
sv
)− Φ( 0−µ
sv
)
+ 1 < 0
if b∗ >
σv(Φ( l−µ
sv
)− Φ( 0−µ
sv
))
3× φ(µ∗−µ
sv
)× V ′′(x− b∗) (A.5)
The condition on b∗ ensures that the distribution of taxpayers is dense enough
around the equilibrium tax rate so that the benefit from a higher tax rate is
more than offset by a loss of taxpayers.
Hence, as pii strictly increases in bi if bi < b∗ and strictly decreases in bi if
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bi > b
∗ and (A.5) holds, and as pii converges towards 0.5 × b∗, bi = bj = b∗
constitutes a NE. 
Proof of uniqueness of NE bi = bj = b
∗ for warm glow
Asymmetric NE, i.e. bi 6= bj , can be ruled out as a country having a lower tax
level than the other can always increase its tax revenue by increasing its tax
level:
∂pii
∂bi
= bi ×
∂α∗
∂bi
× 1
sv
φ(α
∗−m
sv
)
Φ( l−m
sv
)− Φ( 0−m
sv
)
+
Φ(α
∗−m
sv
)− Φ( 0−m
sv
)
Φ( l−m
sv
)− Φ( 0−m
sv
)
> 0 if bi < bj (A.6)
Now assume that bi = bj < b∗. As b∗ is the tax level preferred by the
taxpayer with mean altruistic preferences, one half of the voters prefers less and
one half prefers more taxation and redistribution. It follows that less than half
of the taxpayers prefers b < b∗. Thus, if country i marginally increases its tax
level, it can attract all taxpayers with a preferred b larger than bj instead of
just 0.5 taxpayers. Therefore,
∂pii
∂bi
> 0, if bi = bj < b
∗ (A.7)
and there are no symmetric NE bi = bj < b∗.
Finally, consider the case of bi = bj > b∗. Country i has an incentive to
reduce its tax rate if there exists a pii, given bi < bj , that is greater than
bj
2 .
This condition can be reformulated as
Φ(α
∗−µ
sv
)− Φ( 0−µ
sv
)
Φ( l−µ
sv
)− Φ( 0−µ
sv
)
>
bj
2bi
(A.8)
As bi → bj , this inequation becomes
Φ
(
V ′(x−bj)−µ
sv
)
− Φ( 0−µ
sv
)
Φ( l−µ
sv
)− Φ( 0−µ
sv
)
>
1
2
(A.9)
where the left-hand side gives the number of taxpayers settling in country i.
Note that the left hand side converges towards a value greater than 0.5 because
V ′(x− bj) > V ′(x− b∗)
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⇒ Φ
(
V ′(x− bi)− µ
σv
)
> Φ
(
V ′(x− b∗)− µ
σv
)
= 0.5 if bj > b
∗ (A.10)
This inequality always holds as the tax rate bj > b∗ is preferred by less than half
of the taxpayers, and thus the number of taxpayers attracted by bj−ε = bi > b∗
is greater than 0.5. Therefore, country i can always increase its tax revenues
by deviating from bi = bj > b∗, and thus there are no symmetric NE with
bi = bj > b
∗. 
Proof of asymptotic stability of NE bi = bj = b
∗ for warm
glow
Assume that bj < bi = b∗. Country i may find it optimal to increase or decrease
its tax level because bi = b∗ may not fulfill the optimality criterion ∂pii∂bi = 0 if
bj < bi = b
∗. If, on the one hand, country i finds it optimal to set bi < b∗ and
attract more taxpayers at a lower tax level, then country j will find it optimal,
as outlined in the proof of uniqueness, to set a tax level of bj = bi + ε and thus
have a higher number of taxpayers at a higher tax rate. As now country i will
also set bi = bj + ε, this process continues and tax levels converge from below
towards bi = bj = b∗.
If, on the other hand, country i sets bi > b∗ to increase its tax revenues
by charging a higher tax from a lower number of taxpayers, country j will also
increase its tax level as ∂pij∂bj > 0 if bj < bi. By setting bj = bi − ε, country j
will attract more taxpayers at a higher tax rate, which in turn will lead country
i to adjust its tax level to bi = bj − ε. This process continues and tax levels
converge from above towards bi = bj = b∗. 
Appendix to section 4
Proof of the existence of a NE for pure altruism
There exists a pure strategy NE given by
b∗ = bi = bj = x− n
2
(µ∗)2
(A.11)
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Assume that country j chooses a tax level of b∗. Tax revenues in country i are
pii = bi ×mi =

0.5× (x− n2(µ∗)2 ) if bi = bj = b∗
bi × F(
α∗−µ
sv
)−F( 0−µ
sv
)
F( l−µ
sv
)−F( 0−µ
sv
)
if bimini <
bj(1−mi)
nj
bi × (1− F(
a
∗−µ
sv
)−F( 0−µ
sv
)
F( l−µ
sv
)−F( 0−µ
sv
)
) if bimini >
bj(1−mi)
nj
(A.12)
α∗, however, is a function of bi with the first derivative
∂α∗
∂bi
=
1
2
√
x− bi × ( bimin − bj(1−mi)n )
+
mi × (
√
x− bi −
√
x− bj)
n× ( bimin − bj(1−mi)n )2
> 0 (A.13)
Holding mi constant at 0.5, any tax rate deviating from b∗ will be preferred
by less than half of the taxpayers as b∗ is just the tax rate which half of the
taxpayers consider to be too low and half to be too high. This, in turn, further
punishes a deviation from b∗ as
∂α∗
∂mi
=
−( bin + bjn )× (
√
x− bi −
√
x− bj)
( bimin − bj(1−mi)n )2
< 0 if bi > bj (A.14)
∂α∗
∂mi
=
( bin +
bj
n )× (
√
x− bi −
√
x− bj)
( bimin − bj(1−mi)n )2
> 0 if bi < bj (A.15)
which means that a loss of taxpayers alters α∗ unfavourably for country i. By
positively deviating from b∗, country i reduces its tax revenues as the outflow
of taxpayers outweighs the higher tax rate per remaining taxpayer. A negative
deviation can never be optimal as it attracts less taxpayers at a lower tax rate.
Thus, b∗ is the optimal tax rate for country i given bj = b∗. 
Proof of the existence of a NE for inequity aversion
The proof for the existence of a pure strategy NE with inequity aversion is
similar to the pure altruism case and is available upon request.
Proof of the existence and stability of a NE for asymmetric
countries with pure altruism
As has been discussed in section 4, if ni < nj an equilibrium can only exist with
bj < bi. The tax revenue function of country i is then given by
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pii = bi ×mi (A.16)
Define Pi(z) as the first derivative of pii with respect to bi at bi = z:
Pi(bi) ≡ ∂pii
∂bi
= mi + bi × ∂mi
∂bi
(A.17)
mi is a decreasing function of bi,
∂mi
∂bi
= −∂α
∗
∂bi
×
1
sv
φ(α
∗−µ
sv
)
Φ( l−µ
sv
)− Φ( 0−µ
sv
)
< 0 (A.18)
as ∂α∗/∂bi is positive,
∂α∗
∂bi
=
V ′(x− bi)
( bimini −
bj(1−mi)
nj
)
+
mi × (V (x− bi)− V (x− bj))
ni × ( bimini −
bj(1−mi)
nj
)2
> 0 (A.19)
pii is a continuous function on the interval ]bj , x[, Pi(z) < 0 as z → x and
Pi(z) > 0 as z → bj if mi|bi→bj > (|bi× ∂mi∂bi |)|bi→bj , so pii has a local maximum
on the interval ]bj , x[. Similarly, pij has a local maximum on the interval ]0, bi[
if mj |bj→bi < (|bj × ∂mj∂bj |)|bj→bi . The conditions on mi|bi→bj and mj |bj→bi hold
if nj is sufficiently larger than ni and µ and l are sufficiently high.
Setting (A.17) equal to zero and solving for bi gives the best response function
for country i's tax rate given country j's tax rate. Define
Qi = − mi∂mi
∂bi
(A.20)
as this best response function. ∂Qi∂bj > 0 as bj → 0 and Qi = bj as bj → x, so Qi
is increasing in bj . Furthermore, Pj(z) < 0 as z → bi and Pj(z) > 0 as z → 0,
so the optimal tax rate response of country j has to lie between 0 and bi. Thus,
an equilibrium in tax rates is reached where the positive effect on Qi from an
increasing bj balances with the negative effect on Pi(z) from approaching x, and
where Pj(z) equals 0 given bi.
Denote by b∗i and b
∗
j an equilibrium in tax rates as given by the previous
paragraphs. The second derivative of mi with respect to α∗ is positive while the
second derivative of (15) with respect to mi is negative, and thus the migratory
response to a change in tax rates peters out, i.e. a deviation from equilibrium
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does not cause an all-or-nothing migratory response:
∂2mi
∂(α∗)2
> 0 if α∗ < µ
∂2α∗
∂m2i
= 2×
( bini +
bj
nj
)2 × (√x− bj −√x− bi)
( bimini −
bj(1−mi)
nj
)3
> 0 (A.21)
Thus, bi → b∗i and bj → b∗j if one or both countries do not initially choose
their equilibrium tax rate. 
Proof of the existence of a NE for asymmetric countries
with inequity aversion
The proof for the existence of a pure strategy NE with inequity aversion is
similar to the pure altruism case and is available upon request.
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